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Abstract 
 
This study draws on a sample of 108 private and publicly listed German companies that 
completed at least one M&A deal in 2007-2015. Thereby it investigates the difference 
between the degree of family and institutional ownership and its respective influence on 
corporate strategic investment decisions, specifically focusing on merger and acquisition 
(M&A) investments. Furthermore, based on previous research, revealing similar innovative 
characteristics and benefits of corporate entrepreneurship and M&As, this study investigates 
how corporate entrepreneurship moderates the aforementioned relationships respectively. 
Thereby the study strives to ascertain whether both corporate entrepreneurship and M&As are 
either mutually exclusive or co-existing in corporations. Eventually, the results suggest no 
significant relationship between family ownership and the degree of M&A investments. 
Additional investigations further reveal that a family’s supplementary involvement in the 
corporate management board neither constitutes a significant negative moderation. In other 
words, this means that the relationship is not negatively amplified when family members have 
a majority ownership stake in the company while simultaneously operating in the corporate 
management board likewise. Contrary to the generally assumed paradigm of institutional 
investors’ passive behavior in strategic decision matters, their increasing ownership stakes 
negatively influence the degree of M&A investments. Furthermore, corporate 
entrepreneurship, measured in terms of R&D intensity and patents, reveals incoherent but 
significant findings and thereby illustrates its widespread influencing components in different 
corporate settings. In particular, R&D intensity negatively moderates the relationship between 
family ownership and M&A investments but constitutes no significant moderation on the 
relationship with institutional ownership. Patents, however, moderate the relationship with 
family ownership positively, while having a negative moderating effect on the relationship 
between institutional ownership and the degree of M&A investments. 
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1. Introduction 
 
For decades, the existence of family businesses constitutes an essential contribution to the 
global economy. Almost two-thirds of the worldwide business organizations are identified as 
family firms, emphasizing its considerable economic importance (Family Firm Institute, 
2016). Most notably, Europe is characterized by a large fraction of family firms accounting 
for 14 million businesses of this organizational type (European Family Businesses, 2016) and 
encompassing 50 percent of the world’s 500 largest family businesses (EY, 2015). Nowadays, 
family firms employ 60 million people in the European private sector and contribute about 50 
percent to the European gross domestic product (European Family Businesses, 2016). 
Remarkably, three German corporations, in particular Volkswagen AG, Bayerische 
Motorenwerke (BMW) AG and the Schwarz Group are among the top five largest family 
businesses in Europe in terms of revenue (EY, 2015). 
 
Family firms are characterized by a substantial influence of families or individuals on the 
corporations and its strategic decisions by means of their ownership stakes and/or 
management positions (König, Kammerlander, & Enders, 2013). Despite the lack and yet 
ambiguous definition of family firms (Benavides-Velasco, Quintana-García, & Guzmán-
Parra, 2013), scholars acknowledged increasing attention on the research in this academic 
field and identified differences with non-family firms (Chrisman J. J., Kellermanns, Chan, & 
Liano, 2010), specifically with respect to their corporate strategies, objectives (Tagiuri, 1992) 
and organizational cultures (Dertouzos, Lester, & Solow, 1989). Moreover, studies 
particularly demonstrated families’ preference for non-economic and non-financial objectives 
over the sole corporate profit-maximization (Gómez-Mejia, Haynes, Nuñez-Nickel, Jacobson, 
& Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). This phenomenon is referred to as socioemotional wealth (SEW) 
preservation, which involved attributes such as the exercise of power, the continuity of the 
family dynasty and influences on the corporate strategic direction (Gómez-Mejia et al., 2007; 
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2013; Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012).  
 
Corroborating the theory of SEW preservation, family businesses are often regarded as risk-
averse compared to their non-family corporation counterparts (Cabrera-Suárez, De Sará-
Pérez, & García-Almeida, 2001). Nonetheless, just recently the Volkswagen AG, whereof the 
Piech/Porsche family owns 53 percent of the corporation, astonished with its 300 million 
dollar investment in the start-up company Gett (Financial Times, 2016) and highlights the 
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regularly trending disclosures about investments in new external corporations and start-ups as 
well as merger and acquisitions (M&A). The strategic management literature generally 
investigates the importance of external corporate investments in terms of M&As and 
considers those as an important driver of corporate performance (Yen & André, 2007). 
Starting in the mid-1990s and reaching a major peak in 2000, M&A activities were 
remarkably on the rise among global corporations (Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, & Zulehner, 
2003). Since then, the extent of M&A activities remained constant and notably Germany is 
still a leading country in terms of its investments in M&As (Corporate Finance Europe, 
2016). Yet, scholars claim that family firms tend to be reluctant to invest in new corporations 
(Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjöberg & Wiklund, 2007) and consequently may miss to draw upon the 
benefits of complementing and diversifying the corporate portfolio (Porter, 1990). An 
underlying reason for the families’ conservative approach towards such investments is the 
avoidance of potential value destruction when acquiring other companies (Caprio, Croci & 
del Giudica, 2010). 
 
In line with the differences of risk-taking behavior between family firms and non-family 
firms, an ongoing field of research in the strategic management is corporate entrepreneurship. 
According to Zahra (1995), corporate entrepreneurship is a company’s activity to revitalize its 
current business and remain sustainably competitive through diversified products, innovations 
and entering new markets that yield increased growth and profitability (Kuratko, Ireland, & 
Hornsby, 2001). However, similar to the assumption of family firms’ conservative investment 
behavior in M&As, the implementation and success of corporate entrepreneurship depends on 
the families’ attitude towards risk-taking to induce corporate change and pro-activeness 
(Levinson, 1971; Covin & Selvin, 1991). 
 
In the context of high corporate family ownership, M&A investments and corporate 
entrepreneurship are considered to be dependent on family members exerting their power and 
voice in the corporation to meet their own interests (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003). 
Thereby, families rather prefer the continuity to control their business (Gómez-Mejia, Haynes, 
Nuñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007) and thus are reluctant to sell controlling 
stakes to outsiders, which consequently can trigger fewer M&As compared to non-family 
firms (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008). Even though scholars identified a positive relationship 
between corporate entrepreneurship and firms’ financial performance (Bierwerth, Schwens, 
Isidor, & Kabst, 2015; Karacaoglu, Bayrakdaroglu, & Firat Botan, 2012), the topic is still 
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fairly unexplored in association with family involvement and M&As (Kellermanns & 
Eddleston, 2006). Previous research was mainly limited on the influence of M&As and 
corporate entrepreneurship on firm performance. However, the influence of corporate 
entrepreneurship and M&A investments have never been simultaneously investigated in the 
context of varying ownership degrees, thus leading to the following research question:  
 
“How does the degree of family ownership, in comparison to institutional ownership, 
influence M&A investments and to what extend does corporate entrepreneurship affect this 
relationship respectively?” 
 
This study has several theoretical contributions to the existing literature of family firms and 
ownership structures. Firstly, scholars previously identified risk-taking and pro-activeness as 
the overlapping influences that nurture corporate entrepreneurship and external corporate 
investments, such as M&As (Covin & Selvin, 1991). Nonetheless, both concepts essentially 
differ regarding the value creation benefits. Whereas corporate entrepreneurship is internally 
focused through the generation of innovations and idea within the corporation, M&A 
investments are externally focused to gain new resources by means of acquisitions of related 
or unrelated companies. Despite its overlapping characteristics and underlying intentions, 
previous research missed to investigate its concurrent existence in a corporation and to reveal 
whether both are co-existing or mutually exclusive in a corporation. 
 
Secondly, previous literature on family firms and ownership predominantly considered family 
involvement in a more general manner (Claessens et al., 2002). However, recognizing the 
varying effect that could evolve through different degrees of involvement in a company, this 
study specifically distinguishes between family ownership and family management to 
investigate its individual and combined effect respectively. Thereby it can be ascertained 
whether the families’ say in a corporation through their ownership stakes is enforced when 
family members are additionally represented in a management position. Hence, more 
profound insights with regard to M&A investments in family-controlled firms are revealed.  
 
Thirdly, previous studies focused on publicly listed companies in the context of family 
ownership. Yet, it is important to note that Germany consists of a large fraction of unlisted, 
private corporations. Consequently, the sample of this study contains both organizational 
types as the Orbis database provides the key figures necessary for this research. 
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The thesis is structured as follows. At first, the literature review investigates ownership 
structures, M&As and corporate entrepreneurship in the context of previously compiled 
literature. Secondly, in order to advance previous research, hypotheses are developed that 
jointly yield the guiding research model of the thesis. Thirdly, the research methodology, the 
operationalized measures and the statistical regression analysis are introduced. Thereafter, the 
regression results are discussed and set against previous research findings, while also 
mentioning the study’s limitations and suggestions for future research. Lastly, the important 
findings are summarized in the conclusion. 
 
 
2. Literature Review & Hypotheses Development 
 
The following literature review introduces the reader to the general context of the topic, 
referring to previous researches by specifically focusing on family firms, family ownership as 
well as M&A investments and corporate entrepreneurship. During the course of the following 
paragraphs, the review reveals gaps and contradicting insights that lead to several hypotheses 
investigating the influence of family ownership on M&A activities. To broaden the 
perspective on the topic, the influence of institutional ownership is further considered to 
compare firms with higher family ownership to those with higher institutional ownership. 
 
2.1. Definition of Family Firms 
In today’s economy, family firms make up a large fraction of global corporations and their 
key importance is emphasized by the substantial contribution to the world economy 
(Astrachan & Shanker, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). According to the Family Firm 
Institute (2016), family firms represent two-thirds of all global business organizations and 
thereby contribute at least 70 but up to 90 percent to the global gross domestic product 
(GDP). Moreover, the economy largely benefits from family firms through the creation of 
employment and new innovations (Astrachan, 2003). Despite the topic’s global importance, 
the literature yet lacks to clearly define the organizational type of family firms in order to 
achieve a clear distinction from non-family organizations (Benavides-Velasco, Quintana-
García, & Guzmán-Parra, 2013). Nonetheless, the literature generally often refers to family 
firms as the unit of analysis. Consequently, the underlying reasons for the varying findings 
among different researches might be attributed to the diverse definitions of family firms being 
employed by the respective scholars. However, previous literature convenes by means of two 
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coherently applied criterions to define family firms: (1) family ownership and (2) family’s 
involvement in management boards (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999). Hereof, some 
scholars apply a rather liberal definition and consider corporations as family firms when the 
families are either involved solely by means of their ownership stakes or active operation in 
the corporate management (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Other studies claim a more precise 
definition, specifically requiring the exclusive substantial presence of families in management 
positions (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella Jr, 2007), whereas others exclusively 
require a substantial stake of ownership through voting rights and cash flows that enable them 
to influence the strategic direction of the company (Peng & Jiang, 2010). A more constrained 
definition is applied by Gómez-Mejia et al. (2014) and Arregle et al. (2007), requiring both 
aforementioned conditions to apply plus a minimum ownership stake held by a single family 
in the company, ranging from 10 percent (Gómez-Mejía, Makri, & Kintana, 2010; Pindado, 
Requejo, & de la Torre, 2011) to more than 50 percent (Graves & Thomas, 2006; Leach, et 
al., 1990) or above 60 percent (Donckels & Frohlich, 1991). 
 
2.2. Family Ownership 
Empirical studies about corporate ownership structures revealed increasing interest in the 
topic within the last years. Thereby, scholars focused specifically on the costs and benefits of 
concentrated ownerships and the unique characteristics (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001; 
Bebchuk, Kraakman, & Triantis, 2000). Most notably, family firms are identified with a high 
degree of ownership concentration (Shim & Okamuro, 2011) and characterize the corporate 
landscape in Western Europe. Furthermore, patterns of previous studies confirm the 
continuity of the family control over generations, after the retirement of founding families and 
individuals (Faccio & Lang, 2002; Burkhart & Panunzi, 2003).  
 
The concentration of family ownership is often associated with corporate benefits. Research 
frequently focuses on the families’ intangible benefits of having full control over a company, 
such as “amenity potential”, which are non-pecuniary private benefits to optimize the 
families’ utility (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Burkhart & Panunzi, 2003). Moreover, Burkhart & 
Panunzi (2003) empirically emphasize the family’s name as an important facilitator of the 
company’s reputation that gives rise to an enhanced corporate performance. Beyond, by 
means of a more quantitative study based on performance metrics, further scholars investigate 
the influence of agency costs in companies with increased ownership concentration. Thereby, 
the findings of Lemmon & Lins (2003) do not acknowledge any optimization of shareholders’ 
The Influence of Family and Institutional Ownership on Merger & Acquisition Investments and the Role of Corporate Entrepreneurship 
 
             Nova School of Business and Economics  |  Master Thesis - Alexander Kaden Page | 11 
interests for companies with concentrated rather than diffused ownership structures. 
Moreover, a growing body of empirical research focuses on how ownership structures 
influence firm performance (Chrisman J. , Kellermanns, Chan, & Liano, 2010; Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003). Scholars suggest prevalently increased firm value if corporations have 
concentrated rather than dispersed ownership structures in place (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
McConaughy, Walker, Henderson, & Mishra, 1998; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002). 
Focusing more specifically on family ownership, further research streams intensified previous 
studies on ownership concentration but ascertained diverging implications. Therein, 
Holderness & Sheehan (1988) determine the negative relationship between families’ 
controlling ownership and performance when comparing it to corporations with a more 
diffused ownership structure. Contrarily, other studies observe that family firms are 
outperforming non-family firms, emphasizing the value of highly concentrated ownership 
stakes through families to reduce the classical agency problem among shareholders 
(Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Sraer & Thesmar, 2007). 
Nonetheless, in particular the scholars also admit a declining positive effect on performance 
when families reach a 30 percent ownership stake in a company. The underlying reason for 
this effect originates from the fact that higher ownership allows families to exert their voice 
and power to influence the firms’ strategies and meet their own interest (Anderson, Mansi, & 
Reeb, 2003). As a consequence, families can prevent firms from investing in valuable 
innovation, which eventually could enhance the corporate performance (Chen & Hsu, 2009).  
 
As aforementioned, central in the family firm literature is the predominant investigation of the 
effect of ownership exclusively on performance metrics. Instead of investigating its direct 
effect, the article compiled by Cho (1988) takes on another approach, suggesting a two-stage 
process. Thereby, the author claims the priority to first investigate the impact of ownership 
structures on corporate investments (Stage 1) before focusing on the relationship between 
corporate investments and performance metrics (Stage 2). Hereof, the research regarding the 
first stage is yet only rudimentarily developed (Cho, 1998) and consequently raises the 
underlying motivation to direct the scope and purpose of this research study specifically on 
the aforementioned first stage to investigate how ownership influences corporate investments. 
 
2.3. Merger & Acquisitions in the Corporate Landscape 
The involvement of German corporations often characterized the European corporate 
landscape of M&A deals. Especially in the 1990s around 30,000 take-over deals included the 
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involvement of a German firm, intending to acquire complementary resources to advance 
their businesses (Rodríguez-Pose & Zademach, 2006; Granata & Chirico, 2010). To reach 
clarification, mergers are defined as the combination of two entities into a single company. 
Instead, an acquisition is the process of one company taking over another by acquiring a 
majority stake through cash or stock equity and consequently being identified as the new 
owner (Khan, 2011). 
 
2.3.1. Benefits of Merger & Acquisition Investments 
Besides the vast academic interests in alliances and joint ventures, M&As are further 
corporate activities that can accelerate corporate growth and development (Bauer & Matzler, 
2013). Except for the expectedly decline during the financial and economic crises, M&A 
investments are still of primary interest in corporations. This development and continuous 
pattern of M&As was mainly triggered through the ongoing rapid changes in the business 
environment and the companies’ increasing need for new resources, innovations and markets 
which they cannot necessarily accomplish internally (Makri, Hitt, & Lane, 2010). Moreover, 
the globalization and global corporate connectivity hampers the company’s sustainable 
competitive position with its own resources, thus driving the need for merging and acquiring 
corporate resources with complementing partners (Granata & Chirico, 2010; Sirmon & Hitt, 
2003; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). Underlying motivations that trigger M&A activities in 
the corporate landscape are identified. Generally, both mergers and acquisitions are strategic 
approaches to achieve larger size, increased market share and power as well as faster growth 
to remain competitive in the market (Khan, 2011; Granata & Chirico, 2010). Moreover, 
companies improve efficiency and get easier access to strategic assets, such as patents, 
brands, licenses or management skills that can help the acquirer to reinforce its market 
position and corporate performance (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993; Dunning, 1997). 
 
2.3.2. Costs of Merger & Acquisition Investments 
Contradictory to the aforementioned benefits, further studies reveal diverging insights, 
implying value destructions that occur though M&As. Already in earlier studies, Porter 
(1987) and Young (1981) claimed a high failure rate and a declining value of target 
companies after the completion of the acquisitions. More quantitatively validated, further 
scholars support Porter and Young and reveal post-acquisition failure rates ranging from 40 to 
60 percent (Bower, 2001) or even 70 to 90 percent (Christensen, Alton, Rising, & Waldeck, 
2011). The strategic and organizational misfit between acquirer and the target company is 
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often the principal reason for the high failure rate. Generally, scholars suggest a positive 
relationship of companies’ strategic fit and the post-acquisition value creation and success 
(Datta, 1991; Homburg & Bucerius, 2006; King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). However, 
corporations are often rather solely incentivized by future profitability and competitive 
advantage and thereby neglect the importance of the strategic fit with its corporate partner. 
Moreover, organizational fit considers the similar characteristics of management styles of 
corporations that eventually constitute influencing aspects on the value creation and 
performance in the post-acquisition time period (Datta, 1991). Consequently, in this regard 
family ownership and their dominant control can be an underlying reason for firms to refrain 
from M&As caused by the diverging corporate perspectives and strategic intentions between 
family and non-family firms and their respective managements. 
 
2.4. The Influence of Family Ownership on M&A Investments 
A growing body of empirical research investigates the company’s ownership structures as a 
fundamental determinant of corporate investment decisions (Fahlenbrach, 2009; Caprio et al., 
2011). Yet, earlier studies in this field considered ownership structures more generally and 
neglect the differentiation between different ownership types and their varying impacts on 
strategic investments respectively. A relatively new research stream on ownership structures 
developed, specifically focusing on aspects of family control and ownership. Therein, family-
controlled companies are considered as corporations pursuing conservative strategic 
investment decisions compared to firms with less family influence (Gómez-Meji et al., 2007; 
Carney, 2005; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). Further empirical studies confirm the 
families’ conservatism towards investments by ascertaining statistically significant levels of 
risk-aversion in family dominated firms (Naldi et al., 2007; Gómez-Mejiaet al., 2007).  
 
Contrary to the general implication of Lemmon et al. (2003), who states that the majority of 
shareholders predominantly has a profit-maximizing interest, families pursue other objectives, 
which are not purely economically motivated (Fernando, Schneible Jr, & Suh, 2014). Hereby, 
socioemotional wealth (SEW) preservation influences the families’ attitudes towards 
corporate strategic decisions. By means of SEW preservation, families primarily value non-
financial and affective values instead of being financially motivated in the first place (Gómez-
Mejia et al., 2007; Miller et al., 2013; Zellweger et al., 2012). Thereby, major concerns of 
family owners focus on the retention of their business control and guarantee the corporate 
longevity among future family generations (Arrègle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Véry, 2007; Fiss & 
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Zajac, 2004; Gómez-Mejia et al., 2007). Consequently, being majorly concerned with the 
firm’s continuity, dominating families tend to reduce corporate risk and discourage 
acquisitions in order to primarily avoid disruption of the close-knit social system (Miller, Lee, 
Chang, & Le Breton-Miller, 2009; Friedland, Palmer, & Stenbeck, 1990). The fact that M&A 
deals are associated with substantial financial equity, which may require increased debt from 
external parties, leads to the families’ fear to lose control in the corporations (Dreux, 1990; 
Jungwook & Hiroyuki, 2011). Additionally, M&As are generally associated with high risk 
and uncertainty regarding its post-acquisition performance. However, instead of purely 
focusing on the risks and costs associated with M&As, other researches acknowledge the 
increased value that can be achieved in the post-acquisition period. Accordingly, Sirmon & 
Hitt (2003) find that acquiring family firms can advance the corporate performance by 
“gaining access to and learning new resource configuration skills”. Furthermore, Caprio et al. 
(2011) show evidence that European family firms destroy no value when they acquire other 
companies. 
 
Despite the growing body of family firm literature, the relationship between family ownership 
and M&A activities is yet rudimentarily explored and just recently received increasing 
attention in the U.S (Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; Basu, Dimitrova, & Paeglis, 2009; 
Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Klasa, 2007) and Canadian market (Ben-Amar & André, 
2006). Furthermore, empirical studies in this research field predominantly focus on the 
differentiation between family and non-family businesses. However, considering the 
ambiguity of family firm definitions mentioned in Section 2.1, diverging applications of 
definitions among empirical studies prevent the generalization and comparison of the findings 
and implications respectively. Consequently, by solely focusing on the differentiation 
between family and non-family firms, scholars neglect the influence of the varying degree of 
family ownership in companies. Furthermore, most studies are broadly focused on the 
relationship between ownership structures and corporate performance (Goergen & 
Renneboog, 2004; Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001) but disregard the investigation of 
M&A investments as a potential driver as a step before the actual improved corporate 
performance. Due to the aforementioned contradicting research streams and yet unexplored 
topic of family ownership and M&A acquisitions, the following hypothesis is posed: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The degree of family ownership is negatively related to the deal value of 
corporate M&A investments. 
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2.5. Family Ownership vs. Institutional Ownership 
Institutional investors are entities such as banks, insurance companies, financial institutions 
and mutual funds (Bushee, 1998). In comparison to family individuals, institutional investors 
are often more informed through their expertise and professional analysts and have more 
explicit focus and attention dedicated to complex corporate financial information (Hirshleifer 
& Teoh, 2003; Utama & Cready, 1997). Whereas institutional investors with a relatively 
small stake in a company are more motivated to buy and sell stocks in the short-term (Barber, 
2008), increasing institutional ownership stakes are associated with higher incentives for 
improved corporate performance in the long-term (Kochhar & David, 1996; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). However, even though both family owners and institutional owners tend to be 
incentivized by long-term performance, the underlying motivations are different. As noted 
above, whereas family owners prefer non-financial, socioemotional wealth (Zellweger et al., 
2012; Gómez-Mejia et al., 2007), institutions primarily only seek high financial returns on 
their investments in the corporation (Berrone, Cruz, & Gómez-Mejía, 2012; Kellermanns, 
Eddleston, & Zellweger, 2012). Moreover, compared to institutional investors, possessing 
highly diversified corporate portfolios, families’ risk aversion often derives from their 
undiversified portfolios and investment stake in only one company and therefore triggers the 
reluctance to invest (Zhang, 1998; Pindado et al., 2011; Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Whereas 
the SEW preservation in firms with higher family control triggers less acquisitions in order to 
avoid putting the company at risk, despite the investments’ positive net present value, 
institutional investors tend to make rather rational and quantitative-based decisions (Anderson 
& Reeb, 2003; Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Sraer & Thesmar, 2007; Caprio et al., 2011; 
Wei & Zhang, 2008). In order to investigate how the degree of ownership between both types 
differs with regard to M&A investments, the following hypothesis is being posed: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The degree of institutional ownership is positively related to the deal value of 
corporate M&A investments. 
 
2.6. Corporate Entrepreneurship 
Generally, corporations are not necessarily only dependent on M&As in order to access new 
resources and knowledge. In fact, the value of internal entrepreneurial activities is strikingly 
omnipresent. Transforming new opportunities with its limited resources, corporations can 
achieve a leading competitive edge relative to their competitors (Zahra & Dess, 2001; Shane 
& Venkataraman, 2000). Corporate entrepreneurship is defined as the “process of 
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organizational renewal that has distinct but related dimensions: innovation, strategic renewal 
and venturing” (Zahra S., 1993) and is considered as an important factor that contributes to 
the firm’s success (Zahra S., 1996; Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 2004). Based on the initial 
definition of corporate entrepreneurship through Zahra (1993), further scholars revealed 
broader insights about the individual components of corporate entrepreneurship. Therein, a 
coherent strand of studies converges to a set of corporate behavior that facilitates corporate 
entrepreneurship, in particular referring to pro-activeness, risk-taking and innovativeness 
(Covin & Slevin, 1990; Dean, Meyer, & DeCastro, 1993; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Therein, 
the aforementioned entrepreneurial components are considered to be mutually reinforcing. 
Whereas innovation is the ability to create and introduce new products (Zahra S. , 1993; 
Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Covin & Slevin, 1991), pro-activeness represents the corporations’ 
entrepreneurial tendency to support activities for new market opportunities and achieve a 
first-mover advantage in its industry (Zahra & Garvis, 2000). Moreover, companies 
characterized by its risk-taking tendency, support the previously mentioned engagements of 
innovation and pro-activeness and thus support innovative projects despite its uncertainty and 
the limited level of available resources. (Zahra & Garvis, 2000; Ireland et al., 2006).  
 
Another strand of empirical studies reveal improved financial results, growth and profitability 
for companies adopting corporate entrepreneurship (Kuratko, Ireland, & Hornsby, 2001; 
Zahra & Covin, 1995; Zahra & Garvis, 2000). Therein, the underlying reasons often 
differentiate among studies. On the one hand, corporate entrepreneurship brings about 
benefits of newly developed, tangible resources (Borch, Huse, & Senneseth, 1999), whereas 
on the other hand further studies point out the benefits of intangible benefits, in particular 
knowledge creation and skill development, which eventually again facilitate internal 
innovation (Zahra, Nielsen, & Bogner, 1999). 
 
2.6.1. Family Ownership and the Role of Corporate Entrepreneurship 
The high risk-aversion and conservatism of family firms is not necessarily limited to 
investments in M&As (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Sraer & Thesmar, 2007). In fact, 
scholars investigated innovation in family firms but results are yet inconclusive (Duran, 
Kammerlander, van Essen, & Zellweger, 2016). Whereas some empirical studies imply a 
negative relationship between family firms and innovation (Chen & Hsu, 2009; Chrisman & 
Patel, 2012; Munari, Oriani, & Sobrero, 2010), other scholars provide evidence for a positive 
relationship (Gudmundson, Tower, & Hartman, 2003; Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2008; Llach & 
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Nordqvist, 2010). Moreover, Kellermanns and Eddleston (2006) determine a general pattern 
of low risk- and change-seeking behavior in family firms. 
 
Even though research provides evidence for a positive effect of entrepreneurship on 
performance in family firms (McCann, Leon-Guerrero, & Haley, 2001), the available 
literature majorly disregards the focus on how a changing degree of family ownership may 
influence the generally positive effect (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006). Moreover, there are 
yet diverging findings and implications. Whereas Caprio et al. (2011) claim uncertainty 
avoidance and conservatism investment behavior of family firms compared to non-family 
firms, current economic insights show contrary results. Therein, families control more than 50 
percent of the most innovative, large European companies (Duran et al., 2016), whereof a 
large number of family-controlled, small-medium enterprises are even innovation leaders in 
their specific markets (Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Simon, 1996). Consequently, similar innovation-
seeking incentives of M&As and corporate entrepreneurship, diverging findings in previous 
studies, and the fact that Hitt, Hoskission and Ireland (1990) generally consider M&As as 
substitutes for innovation, yield the question whether the existence of both is mutually 
exclusive in a corporation. Thus, the question arises, whether corporations that support 
internal entrepreneurial activities are less prone to invest in M&As and vice versa. Therefore, 
the following hypotheses are being developed: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Corporate entrepreneurship negatively moderates the relationship between 
family ownership and the deal value of corporate M&A investments. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Corporate entrepreneurship negatively moderates the relationship between 
institutional ownership and the deal value of corporate M&A investments. 
 
Unlike M&A investments that entail new stakeholders, corporate structures and ownership 
distributions, corporate entrepreneurship does not directly affect families’ socioemotional 
wealth, despite its association with uncertain and risky financial investments. Consequently, 
particularly in firms with higher family ownership, corporate entrepreneurship activities are 
assumed to substitute M&A investments. Therefore, the following hypothesis is being posed: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The moderating effect of corporate entrepreneurship is significantly more 
negative for firms with higher family rather than institutional ownership. 
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2.7. Family Members in Management Positions 
High ownership stakes and the involvement in management positions are the principal 
patterns how families tend to maintain control in a company (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 1999). However, management boards in family firms do not necessarily consist of 
family members, who can exert a say on the corporate strategic decision-making (Corbetta & 
Montemerlo, 1999). Whereas some family firms decide to hire external professional 
managers, other firms rely on the competences of their family members, whereof management 
positions often derive from the family’s high ownership stakes (Lemmon, Lins, & Davidson, 
2003). Generally, in firms with high family ownership stakes, a bias to prefer family members 
to external professionals in management teams may exist. This could lead to unfavorable 
selections, due to their limited pool of available individuals and consequently may forfeit the 
competences of qualified external managers (Cerrato & Piva, 2012; Van den Berghe & 
Carchon, 2003; Bennedsen, Nielson, Pérez-Gonzàlez, & Wolfenzon, 2007).  
 
With regard to the differences of management teams with family members and external 
professionals, diverging findings and implications indicate that neither configuration is 
ultimately optimal and both have their shortcomings. Family managers are often personally 
more affected by the risk of failure due to their combined responsibility of ownership and 
management in the corporation (Cerrato & Piva, 2012). This implies that management teams 
consisting of family members exhibit less strategic change (Brunninge, Nordqvist, & 
Wiklund, 2007), are less likely to export (Cerrato & Piva, 2012) and avoid strategic 
investment decisions in uncertain innovation projects or internationalization. This enforces 
the aforementioned implications of sole ownership stakes on the risk-averse behavior and the 
avoidance of complex acquisitions (Ward, 2004). Similar results are derived from researches 
that take on the opposite perspective, investigating the effect of non-family professional 
managers in management teams. Those are considered to exert more productivity (Maury, 
2006), profitability (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) and management’s tendency to support 
company’s innovation activities by creating supportive conditions for implementation 
(Burgelman, 1991; West, et al., 2003; Crossan & Apaydin, 2010).  
 
Despite the negative implication on the combination of family ownership and management, 
the separation neither achieves positive conclusions and rather fosters unfavorable 
misalignments of interests (Burkart et al., 2003) and shared strategic visions (Ensley & 
Pearson, 2005). Consequently, this nurtures the principal-agent problem favoring suboptimal 
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investments (Kirchmaier & Grant, 2005). Furthermore, a coherence of implications among 
scholars indicate higher value, greater efficiency as well as higher return on investments for 
companies with combined ownership and management (Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Castillo & 
Wakefield, 2006; McConaughy, Matthews, & Fialko, 2001).  
 
Recent studies in the family business context mainly focus on the general involvement of 
families in companies but disregard the differentiation between ownership and management 
(Claessens et al., 2002; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003; Chua et al., 
1999; Dyer, 2006) Recently, only a few studies, such as Chrisman et al. (2004), focus on the 
separate investigation of family involvement. A clear differentiation, however, can reveal new 
implications on companies’ strategic decisions, which can be more predominant with 
families’ involvement in the management rather than just exerting control through their 
ownership stakes (Caprio et al., 2011). Furthermore, Block et al. (2013) find out that the 
family firm effect is more driven by family management than ownership, while Chu (2011) 
considers the effect more pervasive when ownership and management is combined. The 
incoherent conclusions about the combination and separation of ownership and management 
as well as its possibly differentiating implications, lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 6: The relationship between family ownership and the deal value of corporate 
M&A investments is negatively moderated if the families jointly possess 
controlling ownership stakes and management positions. 
 
 
3. The Research Model 
 
Instead of focusing on the differentiation between family and non-family firms, the scope of 
this research investigates the relationship between the degree of ownership, held by families 
and institutions, and M&A investments. Throughout the literature review, the identical 
characters and intentions of corporate entrepreneurship and M&A activities became apparent. 
Consequently, corporate entrepreneurship is considered as a moderating effect in order to 
investigate whether both M&As and corporate entrepreneurship are mutually exclusive or co-
existing in the corporate setting. Moreover, previous researches only rudimentarily focused on 
the differentiating effects of ownership and management, whereas some implied that the 
combination of both has a more pervasive effect on strategic decisions. Therefore, family 
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members in top management teams are integrated in the research model as an additional 
moderation. Ultimately, the research model can be visualized as in the following: 
 
 





The methodology comprises a detailed introduction of the applied research method, 
substantiating the underlying research approach to investigate the proposed hypotheses. 
Initially, this section describes the sampling method and operationalized measures for the 
statistical analysis, followed by the examination of the regression assumptions. 
	
4.1. Context of the Study 
Since the scope of this study specifically focuses on corporations in Germany, the unit of 
analysis is the German public and private organization and frames the level on which the 
research builds on. Contrary to previous empirical studies, the context of this research does 
not focus on the distinction between family and non-family firms but specifically examines 
the effects of varying degrees of family and institutional ownership on the intensity of M&A 
investments.  
 
4.2. Sample  
4.2.1. The German Corporation as the Unit of Analysis 
Traditionally, family ownership is omnipresent in various European countries, whereof 






Corporate Entrepreneurship Family Management
H1 (-)
H2 (+)
H3 (-) H4 (-) H6 (-)
H5
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small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). The German “Mittelstand” accounts for the 
majority of all German businesses and is often associated with a high degree of family 
involvement, whether by means of their acquired ownership stakes or because they initially 
founded the business (Institut für Mittelstandsforschung, 2016). Furthermore, a report by 
Germany Trade & Invest (2013) revealed growing R&D endeavors of German corporations as 
part of their growth strategy. Apart from this, three German corporations are represented 
among the top five largest family business in Europe, such as Volkswagen" AG, Bayrische 
Motorenwerke (BMW) AG and the Schwarz Group (EY, 2015). Consequently, the current 
developments in the German corporate landscape, characterized by high corporate family 
ownership stakes, constitute favorable circumstances for the scope of this study.  
 
4.2.2. Sampling Procedure 
For the scope of this empirical study, the data sample is primarily derived from the two 
databases Orbis and Zephyr. Both databases are provided by Bureau van Dijk (BvD) and 
contain ownership structures and detailed financial information of more than 200 million 
companies, while also comprising an archive of global M&A deals and their respective deal 
values (Bureau van Dijk, 2016). Since both databases are derived from the same provider, the 
disfavor to combine two different databases is diminished. Therefore, the risk of incoherent 
and unreliable data combinations that influence the statistical analysis is no major concern. 
Since both databases assign a unique BvD identification number to each company, the M&A 
data records from Zephyr can be reliably matched with the ownership and financial data from 
Orbis to compile one complete dataset for the statistical analysis. In addition, unavailable data 
about ownership information, financial measures, R&D and patents is complemented with 
information derived from corporate websites and company’s latest annual reports. 
 
An initial sample consisting of 562 private and publicly listed German companies is drawn 
from the Orbis database. This sample guarantees the availability of all necessary data 
measures, which are introduced in Section 4.3, in order to conduct the statistical analysis. 
 
Within the Orbis database, ownership stakes are clustered according to controlling 
shareholders and all general major shareholders of the corporation. A controlling shareholder 
is defined as an individual, a family or a corporation that has the power to control another 
corporation and monitor its corporate managers (La Porta et al., 2002). Adapting to the 
specific focus of this research on family ownership, the distinction is important, because 
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corporate majority shareholders are often categorized as industrial holding companies, which 
in turn are ultimately 100 percent owned by a family or individual. Hence, as a consequence, 
those families or individuals act indirectly but ultimately as the majority shareholder through 
their holding company. However, Orbis does not categorize those special cases as family 
ownership (“one or more named individuals or families”) and consequently the primary focus 
of this research study would be diminished. The example of Volkswagen AG illustrates the 
necessity to complement the dataset accordingly: The majority shareholder of Volkswagen 
AG is Porsche Automobil Holding SE, owning 53.09 percent of the corporation and being 
identified as an “industrial company” shareholder type. However, as noted in Orbis, the 
ultimate controlling shareholder is the Porsche / Piech family, as they in turn fully own the 
Porsche Automobil Holding SE and consequently have a direct and ultimate influence on 
Volkswagen AG. Thus, being incentivized to achieve a complete and distinct investigation of 
family ownership in companies, the dataset is adapted accordingly. Consequently, if the 
majority shareholder of a company is not considered as “one or more named individuals or 
families” but as a company, which in turn is fully owned by an individual or family, the 
research considers the majority shareholder as “one or more named individuals or families”. 
 
In order to investigate the reliability of the Orbis database and the aforementioned adaption of 
the data, the HSG Global Family Index (GFI) serves as another source to cross-check the 
family ownership data in the sample. The GFI is composed by the Center for Family Business 
at the University of St. Gallen in corporation with the EY Global Family Business Center of 
Excellence and provides family ownership information of the 500 largest private and publicly 
listed family firms globally. The index comprises 87 German companies, which are 
considered as family firm, but not all are also contained in the Orbis sample. Since 70 out of 
the 87 companies in the GFI are privately held, the complete necessary information about 
patents, R&D expenditures and financial measures could not be retrieved from Orbis and thus 
are not included in the initial sample. However, considering the overlapping companies in 
both databases, a 100 percent match of family ownership information is validated. 
Additionally, corporate websites, shareholder information and annual reports are cross-
checked to ensure the reliability of the complemented sample. 
 
Next, a sample of 9,343 M&A deals, completed in 2007 – 2015 and with the involvement of a 
German acquirer is retrieved from Zephyr. The individual BvD identification numbers allows 
matching both databases and yields a match with 108 companies from the Orbis sample. 454 
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companies (81%) of the initial Orbis sample did not close any M&A deal within the specified 
time period and are assigned a zero as a measure of deal values respectively. However, in 
order to avoid a predominant effect in the dependent variable as well as problems with regard 
to the sample skewness and the violation of normal distribution, the companies without any 
M&A investments are excluded from the final sample. Consequently, the completion of the 
final step in the sampling procedure yields a complete sample of 108 private and publicly 
listed German companies matched with their respective M&A investments. 
 
4.3. Measures 
4.3.1. Dependent Variable 
Deal value of M&A Investments (lnInvestMA). A firm’s degree of M&A investment is 
measured as a totalized continuous variable indicating the total amount spent on M&A deals 
in the period from 2007 – 2015. Since all M&As include a German acquirer, the deal values 
are uniformly provided in Euro and thus currency conversions are avoided. To provide a 
better relative comparison of investment deals in the sample and to avoid a strong skewness, 
the dependent variable is transformed by means of the natural logarithm and is labeled 
lnInvestMA. 
 
4.3.2. Independent Variable 
Family Ownership (FamOwn). Family ownership is a continuous variable measuring the 
degree of ownership a family or an individual person holds in the corporation. The measure is 
represented as a percentage of the total outstanding shares owned by a family or individual. It 
is labeled as FamOwn and can take on the value from 0 to 100 percent. In order to endorse the 
reliability of the ownership stakes, the Orbis data is cross-checked with the HSG Global 
Family Index as well as shareholder structures on corporate websites and reports. The data for 
family ownership is retrieved from Orbis for the latest available year 2015. 
 
Institutional Ownership (InsOwn). Institutional ownership is the second independent variable 
influencing M&A investments and moreover serves as a reference to observe differentiating 
effects compared to the influence of family ownership. Banks, insurance companies, financial 
institutions and mutual funds are considered as institutional owners (Bushee, 1998). In order 
to represent the degree of ownership held by institutions, the respective ownership stakes in 
the sample are summed together. Consequently, the degree of ownership stake is represented 
as one continuous variable and operationalized as the percentage of the total outstanding 
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shares owned by institutions ranging from 0 to 100 percent. The data for institutional 
ownership is also retrieved from Orbis for the latest available year 2015. 
 
4.3.3. Moderation 
Corporate Entrepreneurship. Research consistently describes the characteristics of corporate 
entrepreneurship as pro-activeness, risk-taking and innovativeness (see Section 2.6). 
Consequently, in order to comprehensively capture the moderating influence, two 
complementary variables are introduced as a measure of corporate entrepreneurship: (1) 
patents and (2) research and development (R&D). Patents and R&D are frequently applied as 
a measure of a company’s innovativeness (Duran et al., 2016). Whereas R&D represents a 
proxy for innovation input to generate product and process innovation, patents are considered 
as a measure for the actual innovation output (Duran et al., 2016). Consequently, R&D is 
operationalized as the ratio of average R&D expenditure between 2012-2015 to the average 
total monetary value of sales respectively. The R&D ratio is labeled as RD and allows 
capturing the firm’s relative commitment to internal innovation. Patents are operationalized as 
the total number of patents granted to the company and are labeled as Patent. Consequently, 
to test for the moderating effect, two-way interaction terms for RD and Patent with the 
independent variables are generated separately and labeled as CEFam_Patent 
(FamOwn*Patent), CEFam_RD (FamOwn*RD), CEIns_Patent (InsOwn*Patent), CEIns_RD 
(InsOwn*RD). This allows investigating the measures of corporate entrepreneurship also in 
separate regression analysis in order to observe the moderating effect for each variable 
individually. 
 
Family Management (FamMgmt). As indicated by Block et al. (2013), the effect on strategic 
decisions may be more driven when families are represented in management teams rather than 
only through the ownership stakes in the company per se. In order to examine the moderating 
effect of family management, the interaction variable FamMgmt is introduced, computed by 
multiplying the independent variable FamOwn and the dummy variable FamMgmt. For each 
individual corporate shareholder, Orbis reveals a record whether the shareholder is 
additionally represented in the management board of the company respectively. Hence, if a 
shareholder is classified both as “one or more named individuals or families” and as a 
“Manager”, the dummy variable attains the value FamMgmt = 1, otherwise FamMgmt = 0. 
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4.3.4. Control Variables 
To control for unintended effects that may bias the regression of the proposed conceptual 
model, several control variables are introduced to the regression model. Thereby, the 
company size, leverage ratio, total amount of M&A deals as well as possible industry effects 
are considered. The data for all control variables is retrieved from Orbis for the latest 
available year 2015. 
 
Company Size (lnSize). The difference between large corporations, such as the Robert Bosch 
GmbH employing about 375,000 employees, compared to smaller entities such as the 3U 
Holding AG with only 150 employees, could be an indication for the companies’ diverse 
access to resources in order to finance M&A investments. The size of the sample companies 
is measured in terms of the total number of employees. In order to allow for comparison of 
the firm sizes as well as to account for the high disparity in the sample, it is measured as the 
natural logarithm of the total number of employees and labeled as lnSize.  
 
Leverage Ratio (Leverage). The leverage ratio serves as a financial measure to indicate how 
much capital a corporation derives from debt with respect to its total corporate assets. Since 
previous studies predominantly indicate a negative relationship between the company’s 
leverage and its investments (Aivazian et al., 2005; Ahn et al., 2006) the effect is controlled 
for in the regression model. Since a measure of leverage is not readily available in the Orbis 
database, it is computed manually as the ratio of long-term debt over total assets. 
 
Industry effects. Since different industries may vary with regard to their investment intensity, 
the regression model controls for industry effects. The NACE Rev. 2 categorization in Orbis, 
which represents the statistical classification of economic activities in the European 
Community (Eurostat, 2008), allows to create dummy variables for each industry 
respectively. In the final sample, 4 out of the total 18 different industries are predominantly 
represented, hence each of the 4 industries accounts for an individual dummy variable, while 
the other industries are represented as an aggregated variable. Consequently, the following 
dummy variables are introduced: “Manufacturing” as IndustryM, “Information and 
Communication” as IndustryI, “Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply” as 
IndustryE, “Transportation and Storage” as IndustryT and the grouped residual industries are 
labeled as IndustryOther. 
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Count of M&A Investments (CountInvestMA). Since Orbis does not provide yearly ownership 
data but only for 2015, only a single totalized measure for the dependent variable lnInvestMA 
is considered in the analysis with all M&As until 2015. Consequently, if companies engage in 
more M&As within the defined time period, the respective M&A deal value may be higher 
compared to companies that only closed one M&A deal in total. In order to account for the 
amount of M&A deals that generates the totalized measure of lnInvestMA, the regression 
model controls for this effect accordingly. The variable is labeled as CountInvestMA 
 
4.4. Statistical Method 
In order to analyze the proposed hypotheses, a study on cross-sectional data is conducted. 
Since both independent variables and the dependent variable are continuous, an ordinary least 
square (OLS) linear regression appropriately serves as the statistical method to test the 
relationships. At first, a control model is regressed, including the respective control variables 
considered in this research. Subsequently, each hypothesis is investigated separately by means 
of individual regression models and thereupon compared to the control model. The 
comparison with the control model allows to assess whether the model with the respective 
variables under investigation explains more of the variance in the dependent variable (R2). 
Hence, the independent variables FamOwn and InsOwn as well as the respective moderating 
variables are investigated individually through separate regressions. 
 
4.4.1. OLS Regression Assumptions 
Before conducting the regression analysis, the required assumptions of OLS regressions are 
tested to assure that the data is suitable for the intended statistical analysis: (1) 
multicollinearity, (2) normal distribution, (3) linearity and (4) homoscedasticity. 
 
Multicollinearity. The assumption of multicollinearity is violated if the independent variables 
are highly correlated and consequently limit the research conclusions of the intended 
conceptual model, as it weakens its statistical power (Landau & Everitt, 2004). Table 2 
illustrates the correlation table and allows to check whether the independent variables show a 
significantly high correlation. Moreover, the investigation of the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) explains whether the correlations actually influence the test statistics of the regression 
outputs. According to Landau and Everitt (2004), values above 10 constitute a concern for 
multicollinearity in the regression. However, the VIF values in the regression outputs do not 
exceed the critical VIF value, thus the assumption of multicollinearity is not violated. 
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Normal distribution. Appendix A contains the overview of all histograms for each regression 
model and illustrates a relatively normal bell-shaped curve for the frequency of the 
standardized residuals. Moreover, by means of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, the 
normality can be assessed quantitatively. The test statistic indicates an insignificant result 
(Sig. > 0.05) and emphasizes the validation of the normal distribution assumption. 
 
Linearity. Appendix B depicts the regression scatterplots for each regression model, showing 
the standardized predicted values (x-axis) against the standardized residuals (y-axis) without 
any indication of a curvilinear pattern. Instead, the approximation of the residuals locates 
around a horizontal line at the value of 0. Therefore, the assumption of linearity for each 
model is satisfied.  
 
Homoscedasticity. To assess the violation of the homoscedasticity assumption, the shape of 
the scatterplot cluster should not funnel out, as this would indicate that the variance of errors 
increases with an increase in the predicted value (Appendix B). The scatterplots of each 
regression model illustrates an equal distribution of standardized residuals along a horizontal 
line at zero, indicating that the assumption of homoscedasticity is not violated. 
 
 
5. Statistical Analysis and Results 
 
The following section describes the statistical analysis. First, the descriptive statistics of the 
sample and the variables’ correlations are interpreted by means of a Pearson correlation 
matrix. Thereafter, the regression analysis investigates the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables, while also considering the influence of the moderation 
of corporate entrepreneurship and family management. 
 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics  
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 provides an initial overview and understanding about the 
employed variables in the data sample. Considering the corporate ownership structures, 
families hold on average a higher ownership stake of 18.14 percent compared to institutions 
with an average of 10.74 percent. Consequently, even though it is not specified in Table 1, the 
residual corporate shareholders jointly hold on average 71.12 percent of ownership. 
Interestingly, only 3 percent of the sample companies have a family member being 
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represented in the corporate management board in addition to their majority ownership stake 
in the company. In particular, the corporations with combined family involvement are 3U 
Holding AG, 7C Solarparken AG and Axel Springer SE. Generally, the sample represents a 
broad variety of firms by means of company size, ranging from 9 employees at Pyrolyx AG to 
610,076 employees at the globally operating corporation Volkswagen AG. 
 
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
In the period of 2007 – 2015, German corporations invested on average 1,539,524,000 Euro 
to strike up M&A deals with a corporate partner. In this time period, Bio-Gate AG represents 
the company with the least undertaken investments of 341,000 Euro, whereas E.ON SE 
invested in total 17,156,499,000 Euro in M&As. Generally, the deal values may be inflated by 
the fact that companies forged varying numbers of M&A deals in the mentioned time period. 
To be precise, companies stroke up on average between 2 and 3 M&A deals. However, even 
though E.ON SE is represented with the highest investment deal value in the sample, the 
corporation undertook only 4 M&A deals in total. Contrarily, Siemens AG with the second 
largest investment deal value of 16,697,147,000 Euro stroke up 13 M&A deals. 
 
Furthermore, an average leverage ratio of 0.1667 indicates that the sample of German 
companies investing in M&As generally prefer equity based capital structures over debt, 
Variable n Minimum Maximum Mean SD
InvestMA 108 341 17156499 1539524 3594247
FamOwn 108 0 100.00 18,14 27.38
InsOwn 108 0 93.88 10,74 16.65
Patent 108 1 188975 4970 21679
RDIntensity 108 0 2.21 0.075 0.228
Size 108 9 610076 39993 97430
Leverage 108 0 0.7590 0.1667 0.1657
CountInvestMA 108 1 13 2.4 2.2
FamMgmt 108 0 1 0.03 0.17
IndustryM 108 0 1 0.57 0.50
IndustryI 108 0 1 0.14 0.35
IndustryE 108 0 1 0.06 0.23
IndustryT 108 0 1 0.06 0.23
IndustryOther 108 0 1 0.18 0.38
Valid N (listwise) 108
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which makes them less vulnerable during economic downturns. The low mean leverage ratio 
is supporting the socioemotional wealth preservation and families’ high risk-adversity as 
mentioned in Section 2.4 (Gómez-Mejia et al., 2007; Miller et al., 2013; Zellweger et al., 
2012). Moreover, the descriptive statistics illustrates the distribution of industries the 
companies operate in. More than half of the sample largely represents companies in the 
manufacturing industry (57%) whereas another dominant group of companies belongs to the 
information and communication sector (14%). The electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning 
supply industry as well as transportation and storage industry is only marginally represented 
(6%). The remaining sectors with only one or two represented companies in the sample 
respectively, are illustrated jointly as IndustryOther and represent 18 percent of the sample.  
 
The operationalized measures of corporate entrepreneurship generally illustrate a high 
tendency of corporate internal innovativeness, considering the high amount of 4,970 patents 
on average. Moreover, the risk-adversity attitude towards uncertain investments in R&D is 
observable, indicating a R&D intensity of only 7.5%. This means that companies invest 7.5% 
of the revenues from total sales in R&D. The underlying reason for the low average ratio 
could lie in the fact that the majority of companies in the sample represent the manufacturing 
sector, which is not necessarily investing as much in R&D compared to the pharmaceutical 
industry, which is not notably represented in the sample 
 
5.2. Pearson Correlation 
Table 2 represents the Pearson Correlation Matrix and illustrates the strength of the linear 
relationship between the defined variables of this study. Considering the dependent variable 
lnInvestMA of the proposed research model, the degree of M&A investments is strongly 
positively correlated with lnPatent (r = 0.503, Sig. < 0.01), lnSize (r = 0.661, Sig. < 0.01) and 
CountInvestMA (r = 0.493, Sig. < 0.05) and shows a moderate positive correlation with 
IndustryE (r = 0.165, Sig. < 0.10). Moreover, R&D intense companies (r = -0.181; Sig. < 
0.10) and companies in the information and communication industry, (r = -0.187, Sig. < 0.10) 
generally spend less on M&A investments. Family (r = 0.065, Sig. = 0.506) and institutional 
ownership (r = -0.072, Sig. = 456) indicates no significant correlation with lnInvestMA. 
 
Further considering the main independent variables of the research Model (Figure 1, p. 20), 
family ownership shows a significant negative correlation with institutional ownership (r =     
-0.195, Sig < 0.05). The correlation is reasonable as both variables are mutually dependent.
Table 2 – Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Pearson 
Correlation
lnInvestMA FamOwn InsOwn lnPatent RDIntensity FamMgmt lnSize CountInvestMA Leverage IndustryM IndustryI IndustryE IndustryT IndustryOther
lnInvestMA 1.000
FamOwn 0.065 1.000
InsOwn -0.072 -0.195** 1.000
lnPatent 0.503*** 0.165* -0.026 1.000
RDIntensity -0.181* -0.090 0.010 0.062 1.000
FamMgmt -0.053 0.167* -0.037 -0.184* -0.053 1.000
lnSize 0.661*** -0.012 0.022 0.574*** -0.225** -0.181* 1.000
CountInvestMA 0.493** -0.003 0.016 0.361*** -0.089 0.070 0.384*** 1.000
Leverage 0.123 -0.102 0.117 -0.035 -0.085 0.216** -0.031 0.078 1.000
IndustryM 0.036 0.220** -0.134 0.364*** 0.132 0.032 0.056 0.065 -0.169* 1.000
IndustryI -0.187* -0.040 -0.107 -0.291*** -0.040 0.095 -0.175* 0.041 0.061 -0.466*** 1.000
IndustryE 0.165* -0.060 -0.042 -0.155 -0.070 -0.041 0.082 0.006 0.012 -0.282*** -0.097 1.000
IndustryT 0.151 -0.118 0.033 -0.076 -0.075 -0.041 0.196** -0.106 0.225** -0.282*** -0.097 -0.059 1.000
IndustryOther -0.067 -0.142 0.276* -0.069 -0.047 -0.078 -0.081 -0.061 0.021 -0.536*** -0.186* -0.112 -0.112 1.000
*** Sig. < 0.01; ** Sig. < 0.05; * Sig. < 0.10
n = 108
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Thus, companies with a high family ownership are associated with less institutional corporate 
shareholders and vice versa. Moreover, FamOwn indicates a significant positive correlation 
with IndustryM (r = 0.220, Sig. < 0.05) and a marginally significant positive correlation with 
lnPatent (r = 0.165, Sig. < 0.10) and FamMgmt (r = 0.167, Sig. < 0.10). Institutional 
ownership, however, does not indicate any significant relationship with any other variable of 
interest, except for the correlation with IndustryOther (r = 0.276, Sig. < 0.10). 
 
The operationalized measures of corporate entrepreneurship indicate that larger companies 
spend less on R&D relative to their sales, but achieve to register more patents generally. This 
relationship is indicated by the significant negative correlation between lnSize and RD (r =     
-0.225, Sig. < 0.01) and the positive correlation between lnSize and lnPatent (r = 0.574, Sig.  
< 0.01). Moreover, companies that close more M&A deals possess more patents (r = 0.361, 
Sig. < 0.01). With regard to the corporate entrepreneurship measures, manufacturing 
companies tend to have more approved patents (r = 0.364, Sig. < 0.01) unlike companies in 
the information and communication industry, showing a negative significant correlation 
between IndustryI and lnPatent (r = -0.291, Sig. < 0.01). Lastly, in line with previous 
assumptions explained in Section 4.3.4, larger companies are associated with more M&A 
deals (r = 0.384, Sig. < 0.01). 
 
5.3. Regression Analysis - Hypothesis Testing 
By means of the OLS regression, the proposed hypotheses are tested and the results are 
presented in Table 4 and Table 5. First the main effect of the independent variable, family 
ownership (FamOwn), on the degree of M&A investments (InvestMA) is investigated. 
Subsequently, similar investigations about the influence of institutional ownership (InsOwn) 
are realized. Since corporate entrepreneurship is measured with two variables, both the 
moderation of lnPatent and RD is tested separately as well as jointly in one model. This 
approach allows to investigate the moderation of corporate entrepreneurship as a whole, while 
also examining the differing effect of both underlying variables respectively. 
 
At first, Model 1 contains all control variables in order to investigate their jointly predicting 
power of M&A investments. The model is statistically significant (F(7,100) = 17.098, Sig.     
< 0.001) and explains 54.5% of the total variance in the dependent variable (R2 = 0.545). The 
coefficients lnSize (β = 0.512, Sig. < 0.01) and CountInvestMA (β = 0.297, Sig. < 0.01) are 
significant positive predictors of M&A deal investments (lnInvestMA) and thus significantly 
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contribute to the high explanatory power of Model 1. Notably, the coefficients of lnSize and 
CountInvestMA are constantly significantly positive in all further regression models. Model 1 
serves as the reference model for all further regression analyses to examine the change in the 
models’ explanatory power by including further variables  
 
5.3.1. The Effect of Family Ownership on M&A Investments 
Model 2 to Model 5 in Table 4 illustrate the regression outputs for the relationship between 
the main effect of family ownership and the degree of M&A investments (see Figure 1, p. 
20). Therein Hypothesis 1 predicts a negative relationship between the degree of family 
ownership stakes in a corporation and M&A investments. Moreover, Hypothesis 3 assumes 
that corporate entrepreneurship has a moderating effect on the aforementioned negative 
relationship.  
 
In order to test Hypothesis 1, the independent variable FamOwn is introduced in Model 2, 
while controlling for the same variables as in Model 1. Model 2 is statistically significant 
(F(8,99) = 15.336, Sig. < 0.001) and explains  55.3% of the total variance in lnInvestMA. 
However, the change of explanatory power is only marginally higher and insignificant (R2 
Change = 0.009, F Change (1,99) = 1.911, Sig. = 0.170). Contrary to the proposed direction 
of Hypothesis 1, the slightly positive coefficient of FamOwn (β = 0.096, Sig. = 0.170) 
suggests that higher family ownership leads to higher M&A investments, however, the 
coefficient is insignificant and consequently there is no support for Hypothesis 1. 
 
Next, Hypothesis 3 is being tested, introducing the complementary variables of corporate 
entrepreneurship, CEFam_Patent and CEFam_RD, in Model 3 and Model 4 to investigate 
their effects individually. Moreover, Model 5 allows to investigate their joint predictive effect. 
Model 3 is statistically significant, comprising the interaction variable CEFam_Patent 
(F(10,97 = 13.602, Sig. < 0.001) and indicates a significant change in the explanatory power 
compared to Model 2 (R2 Change = 0.030, F Change (2,97) = 3.531, Sig. < 0.05). Although 
the coefficient of CEFam_Patent is marginally significant (β = 0.377, Sig. < 0.10), the 
positive direction is not in line with the prediction in Hypothesis 3 (Figure 2). This means that 
if companies possess a high amount of patents, the relationship between family ownership 
and M&A investments is positive. Completing the analysis of the moderation effect, Model 4 
interestingly reveals inconsistent regression outputs for CEFam_RD. The Model is 
statistically significant (F(10,97) = 12.705, Sig. < 0.001), explaining 56.7% of the total 
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variance of lnInvestMA. The coefficient of CEFam_RD indicates a marginally significant 
negative direction (β = -0.152, Sig. < 0.10), implying a negative moderating effect (Figure 3). 
In other words, higher family ownership leads to less M&A investments the more R&D 
intense companies are. In order to observe the joint effect of Patent and RD, Model 5 includes 
both interaction variables and is statistically significant (F(12,95 = 11.473, Sig. < 0.001) 
explaining 59.2% of the total variance in lnInvestMA. Moreover, the change in its R2 
compared to Model 2 is marginally significant at a 10% significance level (R2 Change = 
0.038, F Change (4,95) = 2.226, Sig. < 0.10). The coefficients indicate similar directions as in 
Model 3 and Model 4, but are not statistically significant. Hence, taken together, the analysis 
provides partial support for Hypothesis 3, whereof only RD constitutes a significantly 
negative moderating effect on the relationship between FamOwn and lnInvestMA. 
 
        
Figure 2 –Moderation of Patents on Family Ownership     Figure 3 – Moderation of R&D on Family Ownership 
 
5.3.2. The Effect of Institutional Ownership on M&A Investments 
In the similar manner as the previous approach, the second main effect is being tested. To 
briefly recap, Hypothesis 2 assumes a positive relationship between the degree of institutional 
ownership and M&A investments. As previously, however, Hypothesis 4 similarly predicts a 
negative moderating effect of corporate entrepreneurship on the aforementioned main 
relationship. 
 
To test Hypothesis 2, Model 7 contains the independent variable InsOwn. The model is 
statistically significant (F(8,99) = 15.583, Sig. < 0.001) and explains almost the similar total 
variance of lnInvestMA as with the previous inclusion of FamOwn (Model 2), in particular 
55.7%. Furthermore the change of explanatory power compared to the control model (Model 
1) increased marginally but significantly (R2 Change = 0.013, F Change (1,99) = 2.811, Sig.  
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lnInvestMA at the 10% significance level (β = -0.118, Sig. < 0.10). However, the negative 
coefficient is contrary to the hypothesized prediction and thus Hypothesis 2 is rejected. 
 
The statistical analysis of Hypothesis 4 is based on the outcomes of Model 8 to Model 10 in 
Table 5. Thereof, Model 8 investigates the moderating effect of corporate entrepreneurship on 
the relationship between institutional ownership and M&A investments by primarily 
including the interaction variable CEIns_Patent. Notably, contrary to the moderating effect on 
the previously investigated main relationship between family ownership and M&A 
investments (see Section 5.3.1), the coefficient indicates a significant and strongly negative 
moderating effect (β = -0.419, Sig. < 0.05). This means that a higher amount of approved 
patents reduces the corporations’ investments in M&As with increasing institutional 
ownership. The inclusion of CEIns_Patent leads brings about a significant model (F(10,97) = 
14.189, Sig. < 0.001) as well as a statistically significant change of the explanatory power 
compared to Model 7 (R2 Change = 0.037, F Change (2,97) = 4.369, Sig. < 0.05), explaining 
59.4% of the total variance. On the contrary, the inclusion of CEIns_RD in Model 9 does not 
indicate a statistically significant change of R2 (R2 Change = 0.010, F Change (2,97) = 1.101, 
Sig. = 0.337), and even though the coefficient indicates a negative direction, the variable is 
not significantly moderating the relationship (β = -0.126, Sig. = 0.148).  Model 10 jointly 
comprises both interaction variables, indicating similar directions of the coefficients, 
represented in a statistically significant model (F(12,95) = 11.736, Sig. < 0.001). Nonetheless, 
both coefficients are insignificant. Conclusively, Hypothesis 4 is only partially supported, 
whereof patents indicate a strongly negative effect on the relationship between institutional 










Comparing the respective models of each main effect in Table 4 and Table 5 reveals insights 
about the different moderating effects of corporate entrepreneurship on both main effect 
illustrated in the research model (Figure 1, p. 20). To quickly recap, Hypothesis 5 predicts 
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that the moderation of corporate entrepreneurship is more statistically negative on the 
relationship between family ownership and M&A investments compared to the relationship 
with institutional ownership. Considering the coefficients of the interaction variables, only the 
coefficient of CEFam_RD (Model 4) indicates a statistically significant and more negative 
result compared to CEIns_RD (Model 9). Contrarily, the regression outcomes show 
inconsistent results for the moderation of patents, more specifically CEFam_Patent and 
CEIns_Patent. Whereas the interaction variable CEFam_Patent (Model 3) shows a positive 
and moderately significant coefficient, CEIns_Patent (Model 8) is negatively moderating 
effect on the relationship between InsOwn and lnInvestMA. Consequently, Hypothesis 5 is 
only partially supported, considering the increased negatively moderating effect of 
CEFam_RD compared to CEIns_RD. 
 
5.3.3. The combined effect of Ownership and Management in Families 
Hypothesis 6 assumes a negative moderating effect on the relationship between family 
ownership and M&A investment when families jointly possess major ownership stakes and 
management positions in the company. Model 6 in Table 4 introduces the interaction variable 
FamMgmt. However, the variable only contributes marginally to an increased explanatory 
power of the model, leading to an insignificant change of explained total variances (R2 
Change = 0.001, F Change (2,97) = 0.068, Sig. = 0.935). Furthermore, the coefficient of 
FamMgmt is confirming the predicted negative direction, but is yet far from significant (β =   
-0.127, Sig. = 0.719) and thus do not provide support for Hypothesis 6. The respective 





Table 3 - Overview of the Regression Outcomes 
Hypothesis Model Statistical Result
H1: The degree of family ownership is negatively related to the deal value of
corporate M&A investments. Model 2 Hypothesis rejected
H2: The degree of institutional ownership is positively related to the deal value of 
corporate M&A investments
Model 7 Hypothesis rejected
H3: Corporate Entrepreneurship negatively moderates the relationship between 
family ownership and the deal value of corporate M&A investments. Model 3 - 5 Hypothesis partially supported
H4:  Corporate Entrepreneurship negatively moderates the relationship between 
institutional ownership and the deal value of corporate M&A investments.
Model 8 - 10 Hypothesis partially supported
H5: The moderating effect of corporate entrepreneurship is significantly more 
negative  for firms with higher family rather than institutional ownership
Model 3, 4, 8 and 9 Hypothesis partially supported
H6: The relationship between family ownership and the deal value of corporate M&A 
investments is negatively moderated if the families jointly possess a controlling 
ownership stakes and management positions.
Model 6 Hypothesis rejected
Table 4 – Results of the Regression Analysis, FamOwn (n = 108) 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β
Constant 2.517*** 0.315 2.414*** 0.322 2.653*** 0.331 2.382*** 0.343 2.647*** 0.358 2.405*** 0.329 2.559*** 0.380
lnSize 0.557 0.085 0.512*** 0.557 0.084 0.513*** 0.461 0.099 0.424*** 0.568 0.086 0.523*** 0.455 0.104 0.419*** 0.558 0.087 0.514*** 0.451 0.106 0.415***
Leverage 0.769 0.497 0.109 0.807 0.496 0.115 1.028 0.508 0.146** 0.746 0.496 0.106 0.906 0.517 0.129* 0.789 0.519 0.112 0.933 0.527 0.133*
CountInvestMA 0.160 0.041 0.297*** 0.161 0.041 0.299*** 0.159 0.041 0.296*** 0.155 0.041 0.289*** 0.152 0.041 0.283*** 0.164 0.042 0.304*** 0.137 0.043 0.254***
IndustryI -0.342 0.239 -0.102 -0.312 0.239 -0.093 -0.196 0.249 -0.058 -0.305 0.240 -0.091 -0.188 0.249 -0.056 -0.321 0.243 -0.096 -0.167 0.255 -0.050
IndustryE 0.566 0.349 0.112 0.613 0.350 0.121* 0.760 0.362 0.150** 0.594 0.349 0.117* 0.756 0.362 0.149** 0.611 0.353 0.121* 0.771 0.363 0.152**
IndustryT 0.266 0.375 0.053 0.336 0.377 0.066 0.447 0.384 0.088 0.324 0.375 0.064 0.454 0.384 0.090 0.339 0.381 0.067 0.409 0.386 0.081
IndustryOther -0.030 0.215 -0.010 0.025 0.217 0.008 0.035 0.216 0.011 0.023 0.218 0.007 0.033 0.217 0.011 0.025 0.220 0.008 0.037 0.226 0.012
FamOwn 0.004 0.003 0.096 -0.010 0.008 -0.241 0.008 0.004 0.191** -0.005 0.009 -0.115 0.004 0.003 0.098 -0.006 0.010 -0.136
InsOwn 0.010 0.015 0.137
lnPatent 0.046 0.106 0.050 0.076 0.109 0.083 0.162 0.134 0.176
RD 0.024 0.361 0.005 -0.138 0.366 -0.027 0.100 0.415 0.020
FamMgmt 0.848 2.499 0.120 0.388 2.428 0.055
CEFam_Patent 0.005 0.003 0.377* 0.004 0.003 0.303 0.004 0.003 0.278
CEFam_RD -0.075 0.043 -0.152* -0.055 0.044 -0.111 -0.050 0.046 -0.100
CEIns_Patent -0.006 0.007 -0.197
CEIns_RD -0.026 0.028 -0.101







*** Sig. < 0.01; ** Sig. < 0.05; * Sig. < 0.10
(a) compared to Model 1; (b) compared to Model 2; (c) compared to Model 7
0.554 0.616
Complete Model
0.545 0.553 0.584 0.567 0.592
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
0.001 0.071
0.544
0.545 0.009 0.030 0.014 0.038
0.513 0.517 0.541 0.522 0.540 0.508
< 0.001 < 0.001
1.671(a)
< 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
17.098*** 1.911(a) 3.531**(b) 1.528(b) 2.226*(b) 0.068(b)
-- Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 6
Table 5 – Results of the Regression Analysis, InsOwn (n = 108) 
Variable B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β
Constant 2.517*** 0.315 2.562*** 0.313 2.382*** 0.317 2.564*** 0.331 2.487*** 0.347 2.559*** 0.380
lnSize 0.557 0.085 0.512*** 0.560 0.084 0.515*** 0.437 0.097 0.403*** 0.560 0.086 0.515*** 0.420 0.102 0.387*** 0.451 0.106 0.415***
Leverage 0.769 0.497 0.109 0.859 0.496 0.122* 0.886 0.483 0.126* 0.854 0.497 0.121* 0.833 0.490 0.118* 0.933 0.527 0.133*
CountInvestMA 0.160 0.041 0.297*** 0.161 0.041 0.299*** 0.131 0.040 0.244*** 0.155 0.041 0.289*** 0.131 0.041 0.243*** 0.137 0.043 0.254***
IndustryI -0.342 0.239 -0.102 -0.365 0.237 -0.109 -0.119 0.248 -0.036 -0.379 0.239 -0.113 -0.136 0.250 -0.040 -0.167 0.255 -0.050
IndustryE 0.566 0.349 0.112 0.554 0.346 0.109 0.810 0.356 0.160** 0.533 0.347 0.105 0.813 0.358 0.160** 0.771 0.363 0.152**
IndustryT 0.266 0.375 0.053 0.283 0.372 0.056 0.412 0.377 0.081 0.235 0.373 0.046 0.429 0.380 0.085 0.409 0.386 0.081
IndustryOther -0.030 0.215 -0.010 0.066 0.220 0.022 0.076 0.217 0.025 -0.006 0.226 -0.002 0.046 0.221 0.015 0.037 0.226 0.012
FamOwn -0.006 0.010 -0.136
InsOwn -0.008 0.005 -0.118* 0.019 0.013 0.278 -0.004 0.006 -0.057 0.015 0.015 0.212 0.010 0.015 0.137
lnPatent 0.292 0.102 0.317*** 0.280 0.106 0.305** 0.162 0.134 0.176
RD 0.167 0.399 0.033 -0.049 0.400 -0.010 0.100 0.415 0.020
FamMgmt 0.388 2.428 0.055
CEFam_Patent 0.004 0.003 0.278
CEFam_RD -0.050 0.046 -0.100
CEIns_Patent -0.012 0.005 -0.419** -0.009 0.007 -0.306 -0.006 0.007 -0.197
CEIns_RD -0.032 0.022 -0.126 -0.019 0.027 -0.076 -0.026 0.028 -0.101







*** Sig. < 0.01; ** Sig. < 0.05; * Sig. < 0.10
(a) compared to Model 1; (b) compared to Model 2; (c) compared to Model 7
Model 1
0.616
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Complete Model
0.513
0.557 0.594 0.567 0.5970.545
0.071
0.522 0.552 0.523 0.546 0.544
17.098***
0.013 0.037 0.010 0.0400.545
2.811*(a) 4.369**(c) 1.101(c) 2.347*(c) 1.671(a)
--
< 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001< 0.001
Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 4 Hypothesis 4 Hypothesis 4
< 0.001
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6. Discussion 
 
In the following, the findings of the regression analysis are discussed in a broader context. 
The objective is to enhance the complete understanding of the findings and complement those 
with theoretical insights from previous scholars. Furthermore, practical implications are 
presented, while also acknowledging relevant limitations of this research study. 
 
6.1. Ownership and M&A Investments 
Previous research streams usually addressed the sensitivity and decision-making of corporate 
capital allocation decisions rather generally. The combined consideration of ownership 
structures and M&As as well as the distinct influence of families, has been neglected for a 
long period of time, but recently gained growing attention, especially focusing on the U.S and 
Canadian market (Basu et al., 2009; Ben-Amar & André, 2006). This study builds on the 
cornerstones of previous researches that only generally investigated the influence of 
ownership concentration on corporate strategic choices (Zahra, 2009) and corporate 
investment decision-making (Fahlenbrach, 2009). Thereby, the scope of this study 
specifically focuses on M&A investments as a distinct type of strategic choice and the 
influencing role of families and institutions by means of their respective ownership stakes. 
 
As revealed in this research study, the distinction between family and institutional ownership 
in companies appears to be reasonable, considering its differential effect on M&A 
investments. Contrary to the expectations of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, a higher degree 
of family ownership has no influence on the degree of M&A investments per se, whereas the 
association with institutional ownership is significantly negative. Moreover, inconsistent with 
the assumption of Hypothesis 6, neither the joint possession of ownership stakes and the 
presence of family members in the corporate management constitute a catalyst to influence 
M&A decisions essentially, which is discusses in more detail in the following. 
 
6.1.1. Family Ownership, Management and the Influence on M&A Investments.  
The current research findings on family ownership do not provide further evidence for 
previous studies that acknowledge higher risk-aversion and constrained strategic investments 
with increasing family control (e.g. Pinando et al., 2011; Caprio et al., 2010; Bauguess & 
Stegemoller, 2008; Sraer & Thesmar, 2007). Moreover, neither previous findings on families’ 
conservative attitudes towards investments in European firms (e.g. Caprio et al., 2011; 
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Pinando et al., 2011) nor the theory of socioemotional wealth (SEW) preservation (e.g. 
Gómez-Mejia et al., 2007; Miller et al. 2013) are supported by means of this research study 
and consequently it cannot be ascertained whether families act in a way to maximize their 
utility through non-financial rather than financial preferences. Furthermore, in previous 
studies, agency theorist assume that increasing family shareholder stakes lead to a misuse of 
their increasing controlling position at the expense of minority shareholders (Bertrand, Mehta, 
& Mullainathan, 2002). However, also the assumption of agency theory cannot be statistically 
supported within the scope of this research. In other words, the insignificant results indicate 
that the extent to which a family possesses ownership stakes in a corporation does not 
influence corporate M&A investments. There are several underlying reasons that can explain 
the insignificant results. Firstly, the average of only 20 percent family ownership in the 
sample corporations indicates that most of the families do not possess a majority ownership 
stake (above 50 percent) in the company. This implies that families cannot necessarily take 
dominant action to benefit their own interests by actively influencing corporate strategic 
investment decisions such as M&As. Secondly, the sample consists mainly of large 
corporations with 40,000 employees on average. Thus, despite large fractions of ownership 
stakes possessed by families, larger corporations often come with increased bureaucratic 
structures as well as rules and regulations, hindering families to dominantly enforce or 
impede their preferred strategic actions with regard to M&A investments. Additionally, in 
comparison to smaller companies, large corporations are increasingly commissioned to align a 
high variety of stakeholders’ interest, which can essentially surpass the sole predominant say 
of a family in the company, especially in strategic matters that require high financial 
investments. This assumption is further enforced as the coefficient of size (lnSize) shows a 
significant positive relation to M&A investments in all regression models, whereas the 
coefficient of family ownership reveals no significant influence in any model. Eventually, 
unlike the previous assumptions, the insignificance of family ownership can also imply that 
families do not consider M&A investments as a risky and uncertain endeavor but rather 
consider it as a mechanism to reinforce their dominance in the company and thus neglect to 
impede the corporate undertaking. 
 
Apart from the sole influence of family ownership, findings about the joint effect of family 
ownership and management on corporate strategic decisions are inconsistent among various 
studies of scholars. Whereas Block et al. (2013) conclude that families enforce their corporate 
dominance through their management positions, Pinando et al. (2011) reveal contrary results 
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indicating a more pervasive influence through ownership stakes per se. Despite the current 
study’s indication of a negative influence on M&A investments when family ownership and 
management is combined, the result does not provide statistical significance. The 
underrepresentation of companies with combined corporate family involvement could be one 
reason to explain these findings. Only in 3 percent of all sample companies the majority 
family shareholder is also represented in the management board. Thus, this may imply that 
the results cannot extrapolate from the sample to the whole population and consequently do 
not provide any statistical evidence. Furthermore, families may behave altruistically and 
consider the interests of various stakeholders despite their opportunity to dominantly 
influence decisions. Consequently, not only the family ownership and management by itself 
but the interest of various stakeholders are considered in the decision-making process of 
M&A investments, explaining the insignificant outcome of the moderation of family 
management. All things considered, for the scope of this study, neither an increasing family 
ownership concentration does affect the degree of M&A investments in a corporation, nor is 
the relationship significantly moderated if family members take on a position in the 
management board. 
 
6.1.2. The Influence of Institutional Ownership on M&A Investments 
Despite the significant coefficient, the reverse finding to the proposed Hypothesis 2 indicates 
a negative association between a higher degree of institutional ownership and M&A 
investments. In other words, higher degrees of institutional ownership stakes in the company 
cause less extreme investments in M&As and thus institutional shareholders impede such 
investments. The finding provides further empirical evidence for the study of Pinando et al. 
(2011), indicating a tendency for increased investments auditing in firms with higher 
ownership concentration and therefore a diminishing probability of M&A deals. Furthermore, 
the investment preference of institutional shareholders and their expected time span for their 
investment return can further substantiate the finding of the negative association. Whereas 
some scholars suggest that investors prefer investments’ long-term value maximizations 
instead of short-term earnings (Monks & Minow, 1995; Dobrzynski, 1993), this study does 
not provide further evidence accordingly. The results rather support the findings of Bushee 
(1998), suggesting institutional investors’ short-term focus due to their frequent trading 
behavior. However, M&As are usually associated both with high costs and financial as well 
as organizational integration uncertainties in the post-acquisition time period. Consequently, 
those investments need time until the implementation eventually pays off, but the short-term 
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focus of institutional shareholders may hinder these endeavors in order to protect their 
financial claims and the expected short-term return on their investments. Nonetheless, the 
isolated consideration of institutional ownership as the independent variable and its respective 
findings and conclusions should be treated with caution. Previous scholars suggest that the 
separation of corporate ownership and control in companies leads to principal-agents 
problems, which may lead to sub-optimal investments of capital, specifically in connection 
with institutional investors (Stiglitz and Edlin, 1995, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). Thereby, 
managers are incentivized to neglect promising investments in order to prevent the 
disappointment of short-term focused institutional investors, which may eventually sell their 
stakes in reaction to M&A investments and thereby cause the firm’s stock price 
undervaluation (e.g. Graves, 1990; Waddock 1990). Consequently, even though institutions 
possess a majority ownership stake in the corporation, this may not be the only reason leading 
to the negative association with M&A investments. More precisely, the interaction between 
institutional investors and the corporate management board can lead to the decreasing 
tendency of M&A investments. Even though institutions often behave passively, they may 
have an indirect but dominant influence on the corporate management through their high 
corporate ownership stakes. Thereby the management board rather realizes corporate 
investments that pay off in the short term in order to serve the interest of short-term 
institutional shareholders and thereby avoid the divestment of institutions, causing the 
aforementioned corporate undervaluation. Lastly, banks, insurance companies, financial 
institutions and mutual funds often represent a large variety of stakeholders itself and deal 
with others money. Consequently, institutional investors may face a growing internal conflict 
of interest among the stakeholders that refrain the institutions to encourage investing large 
amounts in possibly uncertain M&As and thereby put their own stakeholders capital at risk. 
 
6.2. Corporate Entrepreneurship as a partial Substitute for M&A Investments 
Hitt et al. (1990) considered M&As as substitutes for corporate innovation. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 recognize corporate entrepreneurship as a moderation in order 
to ascertain whether M&As and corporate entrepreneurship are mutually exclusive or co-
existing in the corporate setting due to their similar characteristics and benefits for a 
company. Measuring corporate entrepreneurship by means of R&D intensity and the amount 
of patents a company possesses, the regression outcome shows no moderating influence when 
considering both aspects simultaneously in one model. However, the individual analysis of 
R&D and patents reveal different moderating effects on family and institutional ownership 
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respectively and reveals only partial support for each hypothesis. Whereas a high corporate 
R&D intensity negatively moderates the relationship between family ownership and M&A 
investments, it does not significantly influence the main relationship with institutional 
ownership. More contradicting outcomes are revealed when investigating the moderating 
effect of patents. In particular, the higher the amount of patents, while also being largely 
owned by institutions, the less the corporation invests in M&As. Contrarily, in case of high 
family ownership, a higher amount of patents nurtures higher M&A investments. 
 
Generally, several scholars previously addressed R&D expenditures as the most fundamental 
investment decision entailing a risky and costly endeavor (Lin et al., 2011, Barker & Mueller, 
2002). The findings of this study are in line with Blonigen and Taylor (2000), who 
ascertained a strong negative correlation between R&D intensity and M&A activities, but are 
inconsistent with the study of Lehto and Lehtoranata (2002), who reveal a positive correlation 
instead. The differentiation between the “make” and “take” strategies can reason the negative 
moderation of R&D on the relationship between family ownership and M&A investments. 
Thereby, corporations with high family ownership prefer a strategy that preserves their 
ownership stakes by pursuing a strategy of internal growth (“make”) by means of R&D 
intense investments. In this regard, R&D intense corporations engage in those investments to 
substitute the sourcing of resources externally. Consequently, this implies that family owners, 
who predominantly rely on their own internal competences and resources, neglect M&A 
investments to prevent the risk of organizational misfit and associated post-acquisition and –
merger costs and failures. Furthermore, this indicates that families intend to substitute the risk 
of their diminishing ownership positions in the corporations, which can be possibly brought 
about through a M&A deal as increased debt requirements and new corporate shareholders 
are entailed with a M&A. At last, the finding of the moderating effect partially implies the 
families’ conservative behavior towards investments (e.g. Caprio et al., 2011; Pinando et al., 
2011). Thus, if corporations with high family ownership stakes heavily dedicate financial 
resources to R&D, further investment of equity, dedicated to M&As, is neglected. Evidence 
for a similar pattern in companies with higher institutional ownership cannot be significantly 
validated within the scope of this study. To be exact, higher R&D investments do not 
influence the relationship with M&A investments. Generally, an underlying reason for the 
different moderation on each main effect of the research model can lie in the distinct portfolio 
diversification of both families and institutions. Whereas family members often restrict their 
investments in a single firm, especially if they founded the company, institutional investors 
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tend to diversify their portfolio through investments in various corporations (e.g., Wiseman 
and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Balkin et al., 2000). This can also provide a reason for the amplified 
negative moderating effect of R&D in case of higher family ownership compared to 
institutional ownership and thus provides partial support for Hypothesis 5. 
 
Interestingly, the moderating effect of patents indicates an adverse moderating effect on the 
relationship with family ownership. More precisely, the higher the amount of patents a 
company possesses, the more this corporation invests in M&As. Consequently, patents can be 
considered as a complement rather than a substitution of the corporate strategy when 
investing in M&As. On the one hand, an implication of this result is that firms with more 
patents tend to be fundamentally more innovative and risk-seeking and thus more open to 
further advance their company by means of M&As without restraining from financial and 
organizational risks. Furthermore, the introduction of new patents is often associated with 
increased revenues and a potential leading competitive advantage in the industry. Therefore, 
especially firms with a high degree of family ownership are not restricted by means of their 
invested equity and can additionally invest capital in M&As. This further indicates that 
companies both rely on internal competencies in terms of their developed patents, while 
complementing those with resources acquired through M&As. A contrary moderating effect 
of patents is illustrated in association with the independent variable of institutional ownership. 
Thereby, it becomes apparent that patents are not necessarily only associated with increased 
revenues but also potential costs in the progress of the patent development until its final 
confirmation. Furthermore, newly confirmed patents may require new plants and equipment 
to implement and transform the intellectual property to make it either usable in the existing 
value chain or marketable for the final consumer in order to benefit from new revenue 
streams. The associated costs of patents in the development phase could hinder companies 
with higher institutional ownership to further invest in M&As due to financial restrictions. 
 
Generally, statistical evidence from the regression analysis highlights the importance to 
differentiate between different types of corporate shareholders, in particular family and 
institutional corporate shareholders. Thereby, further evidence is provided by the theoretical 
implications of Fernando, Schneible and Suh (2013), who suggest that family motivations are 
not similar to those of purely economically motivated institutions. Thus, this study achieves to 
advance previous studies that primarily focused on the impact of concentrated ownership 
structures in corporations, neglecting the difference between shareholder types. 
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6.3. Practical Implication 
The findings suggest that higher institutional ownership concentration negatively influences 
strategic investments in a corporation. Generally institutional investors are often considered 
as passive shareholders in a company, nonetheless their influence becomes distinctly 
important when corporations separate ownership and management. By that, management may 
solely act in the interest of institutional majority shareholders and neglect long-term 
investments that contradict with the short-term intentions of institutional investors. 
Consequently, management should disavow from the limited perspective to consider 
institutions as sole passive investors in a corporation, as those seem to have a say in how the 
money is being invested. Furthermore, management boards of corporations with majority 
institutional shareholders need to be aware that varying interests within the organization can 
lead to agency problems and conflicts, which may eventually restrict the management 
strategic investment intentions and operations. Consequently, the sole focus on satisfying 
solely institutional shareholders’ interest may not necessarily benefit all corporate 
stakeholders and consequently may harm the welfare of the organization due to the 
divestment of other unsatisfied minority shareholders. Thus, performance-based management 
remuneration packages that specifically focus on the long-term corporate profitability are 
supportive to align the shareholders’ intentions with those of the management and stimulate 
overall long-term corporate welfare. Contrarily, when intending to invest in a corporation, 
new external shareholders do not have to be concerned about a predominant family influence 
in a corporation, neither by means of their ownership nor management positions. 
Consequently, despite their dominant ownership stake in the company, family may still 
consider aligning the overall interest of stakeholders in the company instead of being 
primarily self-focused and impede investments that benefit the corporation by mean of its 
positive net present value. 
 
Moreover, the significantly negative moderating effect of R&D intensity on the relationship 
between family ownership and M&A investments indicates the corporations’ increasing 
preference for a “make” strategy in order to primarily achieve corporate growth internally. 
Thus, this reveals that companies with increased family ownership and R&D investments 
neglect the potential benefits of acquiring resources externally by means of M&As with 
corporate partners. Nonetheless, the findings of this research should not motivate such 
corporations to fundamentally eliminate the potential engaging in both R&D and M&A 
investments simultaneously. The reason for this recommendation lies in the fact that 
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companies often engage in M&As in order to join the corporate partners’ mutual forces in 
their R&D competences and resources respectively. Thereby the business partnering can 
achieve increased scalability and speed in the R&D progress and accomplish their respective 
objectives and results but with lower financial investments for both business partners. 
Consequently, even though companies invest heavily in R&D, it should not fundamentally 
impede M&A investments as those are not only associated with high investments but also 
with potential corporate benefits and lower costs in the long term. 
 
Furthermore, the diverse influences of the operationalized measures of corporate 
entrepreneurship in this research study illustrate its various facets. Consequently, solely being 
a highly R&D intensive corporation and obtaining a high degree of patent confirmations does 
not necessarily indicate a high internal entrepreneurial orientation of the corporation per se. 
This means that corporations should not solely rely on both measures as the sole indication of 
corporate entrepreneurship, but should also regard rather intangible internal competences and 
resources that facilitate entrepreneurship within the corporation, such as the corporate culture 
and management attitudes. This being said, since the research study does not indicate how 
corporate entrepreneurship and M&A investments eventually influence the corporate 
performance, companies should not regard both as separate but rather complementary aspects 
within a company that can advance the competitive position within the market. Future studies 
should complement the research model (Figure 1, p. 20) with another variable, which 
measures the corporate financial performance after the M&A completion in order to 
investigate how both concepts of M&A and corporate entrepreneurship bring about value and 
consequently benefit the corporation. If significant results are being found, companies can 
weigh the value of both corporate entrepreneurship and M&A engagements respectively, 
always considering their unique corporate setting that differentiate the corporations uniquely 
from each other. 
 
6.4. Limitations 
In order to estimate the reliability of research findings, the study acknowledges several 
limitations. Firstly, the study exclusively investigates German corporations, whereof only 108 
different companies are represented in the sample, which may not be necessarily an accurate 
representation for the population of other national and international corporations. Moreover, 
more than half of the corporations in the sample operate in the manufacturing sector, whereas 
other industries are underrepresented. This may question the generalizability of the results not 
only among corporations cross-geographically but also among different industries. 
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Furthermore, the sample size of 108 companies is not conforming to the minimum required 
size of N > 50 + 8m introduced by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). Considering m as the 
number of independent variables, the sample size should consist of 186 companies, since 17 
independent variables are operationalized in the statistical analysis. This can also explain that 
the coefficients are often only marginally significant at the lowest statistical significance level 
of 10 percent, which is generally still statistically accepted. 
 
Secondly, with respect to the sampling procedure, the initial sample from Orbis consisted of 
562 German corporations but was narrowed down to only 108 companies after matching it 
with the available M&A deals reported in the Zephyr database. Consequently, exclusively 
companies that closed at least one M&A deal are considered in the scope of this research, 
whereas companies without any M&A investment are excluded. The exclusion of those 
companies limits further significant findings on the topic and may lead to inconclusive 
outcomes. Thereby, the research is limited as it cannot be ascertained whether the degree of 
ownership eventually leads to the fact that companies completely restrain from M&As at all 
instead of just influencing the respective degree of M&A investments. Nonetheless, this 
approach was consciously chosen to avoid the violation of the normality assumption in the 
data sample and prevent a high positive skewness, as 454 companies of the initial sample 
(81%) do not have a M&A record in the Zephyr database. 
 
Thirdly, even though the study ultimately investigates M&As as a corporate strategic 
investments with respect to varying ownership types, the outcomes should not be generalized 
to corporate investments in general. M&As are often associated with high integration costs in 
the post-acquisition and –merger period to guarantee organizational and strategic fit. 
Consequently, M&As should be considered as unique corporate investment engagements, 
which are not necessarily comparable to other investments. As such, foreign direct 
investments or investments in plants and equipment have a different situational context. 
Whereas plant and equipment investments need to be decided within short period of time, 
conditional to a tremendous corporate growth rate and increasing sales, M&A deals can take 
on longer decision horizons until the investment is eventually undertaken.  
 
Fourthly, even though the statistical regression analysis controlled for various influences on 
M&A investments, measurable aspects such as the corporate ownership structure might only 
constitute a limited conclusive measure for the degree of M&A investments. Invisible and 
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intangible influences such as the corporate culture or management attitudes, which cannot be 
quantified by means of the Orbis database, may reveal further insights leading to M&A 
investments. In order to advance the understanding of M&A investments, future studies 
should consider case studies, personal interviews and questionnaires in order to obtain a more 
conclusive and complete comprehension of incentives for companies with varying ownership 
stakes. An equal approach could investigate corporate entrepreneurship more extensively. 
Even though this research followed measures of previous studies, such as R&D as innovation 
input and patents as an innovation output measure, the contrary outcomes and directions of 
coefficients in the regression illustrate the various facets of corporate entrepreneurship. 
Therefore, through interviews and questionnaires, future studies can reveal more detailed 
insights about corporate entrepreneurship, not only focusing on quantitative but also 
qualitative data. Furthermore, the implementation of a common measure or index for 
corporate entrepreneurship could further advance future research and would allow comparing 
various studies that intent to investigate corporate entrepreneurship. 
 
Lastly, due to limited data availability, this study follows a cross-sectional analysis and 
considers M&A investments as an aggregated measure from 2007-2015, whereas ownership 
data and the other control variables are retrieved for the year 2015. Even though ownership 
structures are considered to be relatively stable over time and only change marginally from 
year to year (La Porta et al, 1999, Zhou, 2001), causality cannot be determined. Consequently, 
if future studies follow panel regression analysis, causality between ownership and M&A 
investments can be ascertained, considering the respective year when the M&A investment 
took place. Furthermore, causality with regard to corporate entrepreneurship and M&A 
investments are also limited. Thus, it cannot be specifically ascertained whether patents and 
R&D trigger M&A investments or whether M&As take place as a matter to acquire 
intellectual property rights or merge R&D capabilities to share the investment endeavors and 
safe costs with the corporate partner. 
 
6.5. Future Research 
In addition to the overcoming of the aforementioned limitations, future researches can achieve 
more conclusive and complete outcomes with respect to the proposed research model. Firstly, 
according to the two-stage model of Cho (1998), future research should investigate the post-
acquisition and post-merger performance of companies. Even though the study indicates that 
higher institutional ownership is associated with lower M&A investment deals, it remains 
unacknowledged whether those companies ultimately still outperform other companies that 
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complete deals of higher value. Consequently, the integration of a corporate performance 
measure in future studies can provide a more complete conclusion about the successful 
implementation of M&As and whether companies can make up for the increased costs that are 
associated with the post-acquisition and –merger integration.  
 
Secondly, future studies should consider the varying implications associated with the dual-
share system. A differentiation between cash flow and voting right may reveal varying 
outcomes with respect to the influence that families and institutions have in the strategic 
decision making of a corporation. In this regard, the database “Wer gehört zu wem” is 
particularly helpful especially for a number of German small-medium enterprises. However, 
for the scope of this study it is not considered as only a limited number of companies could be 
identified. 
 
Moreover, there is a growing body of news concerning venture investments and M&As in the 
start-up scene. The continuous trend arouses the potential for future research to investigate 
ownership structures and M&A engagements with respect to different types of corporations, 
such as Start-ups, small-medium enterprises, large corporations or conglomerates. This may 
increase the complexity of the sampling procedure as further databases need to be considered, 
but could advance the scope of this study with regard to more conclusive and significant 
outcomes. Furthermore, it allows for comparison between the corporate types respectively 
and to observe varying incentives and influences of each with regard to M&As. 
 
Lastly, the relationship between ownership structures and M&As can be investigated more 
precisely by means of the respective financing models. In other words, future study should 
differentiate between stock and cash financing of M&As. Both are associated with a varying 
degree of risks and could influence the intention to engage in M&A. However, this may limit 
the sample size even further, especially if future studies focus only on German corporations, 





The objective of this study was to investigate the influence of the degree of family ownership 
in comparison to institutional ownership on the degree of M&A investments respectively. 
While previous studies exclusively focus either on M&A investments or corporate 
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entrepreneurship individually, this study recognizes similar characteristics of both and thus 
investigates the mutual existence in the corporate setting. Inconsistent with the initially 
developed hypotheses, the influence of family ownership on the degree of M&A investments 
cannot be proven as statistically significant. Furthermore, there is no evidence for a 
moderating effect of family management, in particular when family members hold a position 
in the management board in addition to their ownership stakes. Interestingly, even though 
contrary to the hypothesized relationship, the statistically significant results provide evidence 
that the degree of institutional rather than family ownership impedes M&A investments. By 
means of the operationalized measures R&D intensity and patents, corporate entrepreneurship 
is not fully supported to moderate the relationship between the degree of ownership and 
M&A investments. However, a closer look at the measures individually reveals more insights 
on the different moderating effects respectively. R&D intensity negatively moderates 
exclusively the relationship between family ownership and the degree of M&A investments. 
Furthermore, patents have a significant, but differing moderating effect on both relationships 
in the research model (Figure 1). Whereas the relationship between family ownership and 
M&A is positively moderated, the moderating effect is negative with respect to institutional 
ownership. The varying outcomes of the moderating measures illustrate the lack of a 
standardized and yet ambiguous measure for corporate entrepreneurship. Consequently, this 
study should lay an impulse for future studies to adopt a measure for corporate 
entrepreneurship that can be generally applied in future studies and thereby allow for 
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